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Posterior cingulateal memories of personal past experiences is an integral part of our everyday lives
and relies on a distributed set of brain regions. Their occurrence externally in the real world (‘realness’) and
their self-relevance (‘selfness’) are two deﬁning features of these autobiographical events. Distinguishing
between personally experienced events and those that happened to other individuals, and between events
that really occurred and those that were mere ﬁgments of the imagination, is clearly advantageous, yet the
respective neural correlates remain unclear. Here we experimentally manipulated and dissociated realness
and selfness during fMRI using a novel paradigm where participants recalled self (autobiographical) and
non-self (from a movie or television news clips) events that were either real or previously imagined. Distinct
sub-regions within dorsal and ventral medial prefrontal cortex, retrosplenial cortex and along the parieto-
occipital sulcus preferentially coded for events (real or imagined) involving the self. By contrast, recollection
of autobiographical events that really happened in the external world activated different areas within
ventromedial prefrontal cortex and posterior cingulate cortex. In addition, recall of externally experienced
real events (self or non-self) was associated with increased activity in areas of dorsomedial prefrontal cortex
and posterior cingulate cortex. Taken together our results permitted a functional deconstruction of anterior
(medial prefrontal) and posterior (retrosplenial cortex, posterior cingulate cortex, precuneus) cortical
midline regions widely associated with autobiographical memory but whose roles have hitherto been poorly
understood.
© 2008 Elsevier Inc. Open access under CC BY license. IntroductionRecollecting autobiographical memories of personal past experi-
ences is an integral part of our everyday lives and relies on a
distributed set of brain regions that includes the hippocampus,
parahippocampal gyrus, lateral temporal cortices, temporo-parietal
junction, lateral prefrontal cortex, thalamus, and cerebellum (Cabeza
and St Jacques, 2007; Maguire, 2001a; Maguire and Frith, 2003a;
Svoboda et al., 2006). Classically, neuroimaging studies of autobio-
graphical memory have focused on characterising the role of the
hippocampus during retrieval (e.g. Addis et al., 2004; Gilboa et al.,
2004; Maguire and Frith, 2003b; Ryan et al., 2001). However, these
studies also reveal large spatially-extended swathes of activity across
cortical midline structures encompassing posteriorly the retrosplenial
cortex (RSC), posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), and precuneus, and
anteriorly the dorsal and ventral medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC)
(Buckner and Carroll, 2007; Hassabis et al., 2007a; Schacter et al.,
2007). Surprisingly little is understood about the functional contribu-
tions these midline brain regions make to the overall recollective
experience. Progress has been hindered not only by limited neuro-
psychological evidence, where focal lesions inmidline regions are rareSummerﬁeld),
icense. (Bird et al., 2004; Maguire, 2001b), but also by the tendency to
consider these regions, especially within posterior portions of the
brain, as a single functional unit. It is unlikely, however, that a unitary
function is being performed either posteriorly or anteriorly, particu-
larly as the activations subsume cytoarchitecturally distinct regions
(Cavanna and Trimble, 2006; Ongur et al., 2003; Saleem et al., 2008;
Vogt and Laureys, 2005; Vogt et al., 2006).
The ubiquity and prominence of these cortical midline activations
during neuroimaging suggest that functional deconstruction of these
extended brain areas is critical to understanding the processes and
mechanisms underpinning our ability to re-experience the past, and
may throw new light on other cognitive functions such as imagina-
tion, thinking about the future and spatial navigation that also engage
some of these brain areas (Bar, 2007; Buckner and Carroll, 2007;
Hassabis andMaguire, 2007; Schacter and Addis, 2007). In the current
study we considered two deﬁning features of autobiographical
memory that may offer some clues about functional subdivisions
within these midline cortical regions: their self relevance (‘selfness’;
by this we mean events that happen to, and so are personally
experienced by, the self), and the fact that they occur externally in the
real world (‘realness’; in contrast to those events created and played
out internally in one's imagination).
Autobiographical memories are personal and highly self-relevant,
tightly bound to an individual's self-schema (Conway and Pleydell-
Pearce, 2000; Tulving, 1983, 2002). Previous neuroimaging studies
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other tasks that were less self-relevant such as rest, semantic memory
retrieval or the exposure to other people's autobiographical mem-
ories, and found cortical midline regions were more active for
autobiographical memory (for a recent meta-analysis see Svoboda et
al., 2006). Surprisingly, although several studies have included both
autobiographical and non-autobiographical/non-self conditions, few
have directly discussed this comparison in terms of selfness (e.g.
Szpunar et al., 2007; Maguire and Frith 2003a). Instead, evidence from
other types of self processing has typically been called upon in the
interpretation of activations in autobiographical memory studies.
Manipulations involving the retrieval and judgement of self-relevant
personality traits (D'Argembeau et al., 2007; Johnson et al., 2002;
Kelley et al., 2002; Kjaer et al., 2002; Lou et al., 2004; Macrae et al.,
2004; Moran et al., 2006), differences in viewpoint perspective (e.g.
ﬁrst or third person) (D'Argembeau et al., 2007; Ruby and Decety,
2001; Vogeley and Fink, 2003; Vogeley et al., 2004), and mentalizing
about the thoughts or actions of oneself or others (Frith and Frith,
1999, 2003; Gallagher and Frith, 2003; Mitchell et al., 2006; Saxe,
2006), commonly result in activation of midline structures and in
particular portions of the mPFC and PCC (e.g. see Amodio and Frith,
2006; Gillihan and Farah, 2005; Northoff et al., 2006; Schmitz and
Johnson, 2007 for reviews). Thus it has been suggested that activation
of mPFC and PCC during autobiographical memory may be linked to
self-referential processing (Cabeza and St Jacques, 2007; Hassabis et
al., 2007a; Svoboda et al., 2006). Rather than making inferences from
self processing in other domains, in the current study we focused on
delineating the brain areas modulated by self processing speciﬁcally
associated with autobiographical memory.
Another key feature of autobiographical events is their realness,
they occur in the external world. Little is known, however, about how
the brain distinguishes real from ﬁctitious experiences, although two
recent studies suggest that cortical midline areas may also play a role
in supporting this crucial ability (Abraham et al., 2008; Hassabis et al.,
2007a). Abraham et al. (2008) had participants make judgements
about scenarios involving famous people or ﬁctional characters. The
authors found that events involving famous people preferentially
engaged anterior mPFC and PCC/precuneus, although differences in
associated detail, familiarity and greater self-relevance/social simila-
rities with real people may have inﬂuenced the results. Hassabis et al.
(2007a) adopted a different approach by directly comparing recall of
recent real autobiographical “snapshot”memories (scenes) with recall
of previously imagined ﬁctitious scenes, matched for the amount of
detail and vividness. While both types of scenes activated several
areas of the memory network in common, PCC, precuneus and
anterior mPFC were preferentially engaged when real autobiographi-
cal scenes were retrieved. However, in the Hassabis et al. (2007a)
study real autobiographical scenes were both real, and more self
relevant compared with imagined scenes. Consequently, this study
could not distinguish between activations representing selfness and
those representing the realness aspects of the memories.
The aim of the current study, therefore, was to systematically
investigate how selfness and realness modulate cortical midline
structures during the retrieval of autobiographical experiences. In
order to achieve this, memory for recent real autobiographical events
was compared with memory for recent events involving other
individuals and from which the participant was absent, but which
were nevertheless similarly rich, detailed, complex, and naturalistic.
These non-self events were of two types, derived from viewing a
feature length movie (“Sideways”; Twentieth Century Fox, Fox
Searchlight Pictures, Beverly Hills, California; 2004) or from television
(TV) news clips. There is a relative dearth of studies in the literature
that have used extended movies as stimuli in memory experiments,
although the use of such stimuli has been suggested as an effective
way to study naturalistic cognitive processing (Furman et al., 2007;
Hasson et al., 2008; Spiers and Maguire, 2007). In addition,participants recalled ﬁctitious (plausible) events previously created
internally in their imagination. Imagined autobiographical (self)
events included the active involvement of the participant (rather
than static scenes employed by Hassabis et al., 2007a). Imagined ﬁlm
events were plausible events that could have happened (but didn't) to
the characters in the ﬁlm, while imagined news events were plausible
events that never actually happened but that could have been
reported on a UK TV news programme.
This experimental design thus allowed us to dissociate the selfness
and realness of complex events in a novel way not possible in previous
studies, providing much-needed insights into the neural basis of these
critical features of autobiographical memory. We hypothesised that
our manipulations would result in differential modulation of cortical
midline structures both anteriorly and posteriorly, and so would
facilitate the functional deconstruction within these brain areas. The
cortical midline structures of speciﬁc interest therefore included
dorsal and ventral medial prefrontal cortex, anterior cingulate cortex,
precuneus, posterior cingulate cortex, retrosplenial cortex, and the
thalamus.
Methods
Participants
Eighteen healthy right handed native English speakers took part in
the study (11 females; mean age 25.1 years, SD 3.7). Only participants
who had not previously viewed the ﬁlm “Sideways” and were naive to
its content were included. All participants had normal or corrected to
normal vision and gave informed written consent in accordance with
the local research ethics committee.
Task and procedure
The experiment comprised three sessions conducted over three
consecutive weeks (see Fig. 1): In week 1 (viewing session),
participants experienced the normal everyday events in their lives
and viewed the movie and the news clips. In week 2 (interview
session) they recalled autobiographical experiences, events from the
movie and the news events. In addition, they created events of each
category in their imagination. In the third week (MRI scan session)
they were scanned using fMRI during which they recalled the real and
imagined events. For each real and imagined event condition there
was also a control task where participants recalled previously viewed
(real) or previously imagined acontextual single objects respectively,
thus controlling for basic recall and visualisation effects. All viewings,
interviews and behavioural tests were conducted by the same
experimenter in the same testing room on the same day (and time)
of successive weeks.
Viewing session (week 1)
The ﬁrst session exposed participants to naturalistic events that
would be used as non-self stimuli and were informed they would be
required to remember the events in later sessions. Participants viewed
the movie “Sideways” (duration 2 h) on a computer monitor
(PowerDVD, Cyberlink). Sideways was selected for this experiment
after extensive consideration of a broad range of movies. Sideways
involves a relatively simple plot, and the events that occur are
relatively comparable to those that could occur in real life. After a
break, participants then viewed 12–17 recent news clips (average
number 12.6 clips) selected from internet news podcasts (BBC London
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/4977678.stm; Sky news
http://news.sky.com/skynews/podcasts). Edited news clips (1–2 min
in length; mean duration 1 min 20s; MPEG Streamclip 1.1, Squared 5;
MEncoder Windows Gui, Hans-Carl Overdalhoff) were played on a
computer monitor (Windows media player, Microsoft Corporation)
and contained reports of minor news events (emotionally neutral or
Fig. 1. Schematic of the experimental structure over three consecutive weeks. Week 1: Participants experienced autobiographical events in their own lives. In addition they watched
the feature-length movie “Sideways”, and watched a selection of short clips featuring minor news events. Week 2: One week later participants returned and their memory for recent
autobiographical events as well as events from the movie and news clips was tested. Participants then created imagined autobiographical scenarios, imagined events involving the
characters of the ﬁlm and imagined news events. They also viewed a selection of acontextual objects on a computer screen and created images of acontextual objects in their
imagination. Week 3: A memory recall task was performed during fMRI. Trials began with a text cue informing participants which real or previously imagined event/object to recall
(further examples of cues are given in Table 2), followed by 20 s during which they re-experienced that event/object with their eyes closed. After an audio tone sounded, participants
opened their eyes and performed a series of ratings (see Methods).
1190 J.J. Summerﬁeld et al. / NeuroImage 44 (2009) 1188–1200slightly positive) from around the world that had occurred within the
four weeks prior to each participant's ﬁrst session. News clips that
participants had previously seen or heard, had personal experience of,
or that elicited speciﬁc memories were excluded from future sessions.
Interview session (week 2)
One week later, participants returned for an interview session.
There were eight different tasks. Firstly, recent autobiographical
memories from the previous four weeks were described out loud bythe participant (RS; real self events). The ten memories selected for
inclusion for each participant were vivid, speciﬁc in time and place,
with a relatively circumscribed time frame, and emotionally neutral or
slightly positive in nature. Secondly, memories of experimenter-
selected events from the ﬁlm Sideways were assessed (RF; real non-
self ﬁlm events). Events were memorable, relatively neutral in
emotional content, comparable to real everyday events and involved
the main ﬁlm characters. Participants described out loud details of
each event to conﬁrm they remembered it accurately and ten very
Table 1
Summary of experimental conditions
Abbreviation Description
Event conditions
RS Recall of recent autobiographical (self) memories elicited in the
pre-scan interview
RF Recall of ﬁlm event memories elicited in the pre-scan interview
RN Recall of news event memories elicited in the pre-scan interview
IS Recall of imagined autobiographical (self) events previously
constructed in the pre-scan interview
IF Recall of imagined ﬁlm events previously constructed in the
pre-scan interview
IN Recall of imagined news events previously constructed in the
pre-scan interview
Object control conditions
RO1 Recall of acontextual objects visually presented in the pre-scan interview
(set 1)
RO2 Recall of acontextual objects visually presented in the pre-scan interview
(set 2)
RO3 Recall of acontextual objects visually presented in the pre-scan interview
(set 3)
IO1 Recall of imagined acontextual objects previously constructed in
the pre-scan interview (set 1)
IO2 Recall of imagined acontextual objects previously constructed in the
pre-scan interview (set 2)
IO3 Recall of imagined acontextual objects previously constructed in the
pre-scan interview (set 3)
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inclusion. Events that elicited strong personal memories were
excluded. Thirdly, memories of the news events viewed the previous
week were assessed in the same way (RN; real non-self news events).
Participants then performed a further three tasks in which they
imagined novel plausible scenarios of three types. In each case they
were instructed to imagine the event and describe it out loud with
their eyes closed (previous pilot testing determined that eyes closed
was most comfortable for the majority of subjects). Participants
typically required 2–3 min to construct and describe out loud a rich
and detailed imagined event based on each scenario. They were
informed theywould be required to recall the details of each imagined
event in the future session. Poorly imagined or described events were
excluded.
Participants were provided with cues concerning scenarios of
common-place events that they had to imagine involving themselves
(IS; imagined self events). They were instructed that the event should
include active involvement of themselves (rather than a static scene),
and to make it emotionally neutral in content. Importantly, partici-
pants were instructed to imagine a completely novel event indepen-
dent of any previous speciﬁc eventmemories (e.g. not an actual past or
potential future event). This was veriﬁed after each trial. Below is an
example transcript of an imagined (autobiographical) self event from
the experiment. The event is clearly dynamic, in a ﬁrst person
perspective, and in the present (rather than the past or future).
Cue: Imagine going for a walk by a stream in a forest
“I'm visiting some family and my auntie lets me borrow her car, a
little red car, and I start to drive to the forest and I've found on my
map there's a nice walk you can do by a stream that ends up at a
waterfall. So I park the car and get out and start walking and it's a
really nice day. Notmuch really happens on theway but youhave to
follow the stream and thenyou come to this beautiful waterfall and
its not particularly big but there is a family there and there are a
couple of kids playing in the water and so I sit there for a while...”.
Participants were then provided with scenario cues for plausible
events that could have happened (but didn't) to the characters in the
ﬁlm “Sideways” (IF; imagined non-self ﬁlm events). Participants were
instructed to imagine the event as if it was playing out on a screen,with themselves absent from the scenario. Importantly, participants
were instructed to create a novel event, independent of any speciﬁc
personal memories or events from the ﬁlm. This was veriﬁed after
each scenario.
Participants were then provided with scenarios of plausible events
that could be reported on a UK television news programme (IN;
imagined non-self news events). Participants were required to
imagine the event as if it was a typical news report (i.e. including
reporter commentary, interviews and related video footage) playing
out on a screen and with themselves absent from the scenario (e.g.
they should not make themselves the reporter). Importantly,
participants were instructed to create a novel event, independent of
any personal event memories or any speciﬁc news event memories,
and this was veriﬁed after each scenario.
In addition to performing these six event-based tasks, participants
also performed two object-based tasks (viewing and imagining).
Participants performed the two object tasks three times through the
interview session, to ensure they were robustly encoded and were
informed that they would be required to recall them in the future
session. Firstly, participants viewed a series of single acontextual
objects (accompanied by short text descriptions to aid encoding)
presented successively on the monitor (RO; real objects) in a self-
paced manner. Objects were easily identiﬁable common objects
presented on a blank white background and participants were told
not to think about possible associated contexts (veriﬁed regularly by
the experimenter).
The experimenter then read short descriptions of everyday
acontextual objects out loud to the participant (IO; imagined objects).
Participants were required to construct a detailed image of each object
in their mind's eye, and to imagine each object against a plain white
background, devoid of associated background context (veriﬁed
regularly by the experimenter). Participants were instructed to create
a novel object based on the experimenter's description, rather than
recalling a personally familiar object. Real objects were randomly
allocated to three separate sets which were identical in nature.
Similarly imagined objects were randomly allocated to three sets.
Allocation of objects to the six conditions was counterbalanced across
participants. The reason for having three sets of real and three sets of
imagined objects was so that each of the six event conditions had its
own baseline condition.
Stimuli were similar in terms of memory age, only differing by a
few days. The recent real autobiographical memories elicited during
the interview session in week 2 had a mean age of 14.9 days (SD
3.7 days) and were therefore formed an average of 21.9 days prior to
the fMRI session. Memories for the events that occurred during the
viewing session (RF and RN) were formed 14 days prior to the fMRI
session, while those in the interview session (IS, IF, IN, RO, IO) were
formed one week prior to the fMRI session.
MRI scan session (week 3)
One week after the interview session participants engaged in a
memory recall task during fMRI scanning. Participants ﬁrst performed
a behavioural practice outside the scanner with stimuli not used in the
main experiment. There were six event conditions: RS, RF, RN, IS, IF,
IN, and six object control conditions: RO1, RO2, RO3, IO1, IO2, IO3 (see
Table 1 for an overview of conditions). There were 120 trials in total:
60 event trials (10 trials per event condition); 30 real object trials (3
real object conditions×10 trials) and 30 imagined object trials (3
imagined object conditions×10 trials). Thus the number of trials in the
event and object conditions was equated. There were 6 experimental
runs each composed of 20 trials. Trial types were randomly
intermixed through each run and across the whole experiment.
Each trial began with the presentation of a sentence text cue (6 s)
spanning two lines that brieﬂy described the event or object to recall
(see Table 2 for example text cues). Following this, the text “Close your
eyes now” was presented on the screen and participants had 20 s
Table 2
Examples of text cues used in the memory recall task during scanning
Events
RS Recall when you went to see the Japanese play in Notting Hill with friends
RF Recall when Miles and Jack stopped at Miles' mother's house for dinner
RN Recall when the man in Dublin invented the new sideways bicycle
IS Recall imagining when you visited a bustling street market one morning
IF Recall imagining when Miles went to a bookshop in town for a literary event
IN Recall imagining when parents with quads met in San Diego for the convention
Objects
RO Recall the pink and orange suede wallet with a leather-effect front pocket
IO Recall imagining the red china teapot with a busy oriental silver leaf design
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out loud) recalled and re-experienced the cued event or object in as
much detail as they could. They were instructed not to construct or
elaborate novel details about the event/object. After 20 s an audio tone
signalled the participant to open their eyes. They then performed
three different ratings using an fMRI compatible 5-button keypad to
provide an instant measure of their perceived performance on that
trial. Participants rated difﬁculty: “How difﬁcult did you ﬁnd it to
recall that memory?” (1=very easy…5=very difﬁcult); vividness:
“How vivid was your recalled memory?” (1=not at all vivid…5=very
vivid) and perceived accuracy: “How accurately did you recall that
memory?” (1=not very accurately…5=very accurately) with accuracy
referring to how well they thought their recall matched the details of
the previously experienced or imagined event/object when it was ﬁrst
described/created. Participants had 4 seconds to make each response.
There was a 2 second delay before the next trial began.
Post-scan debrieﬁng session
Immediately after the scanning session participants were thor-
oughly debriefed. The debrieﬁng was digitally recorded for later
veriﬁcation purposes. Participants performed ratings (range 1 to 5 —
see Results) for each condition. Two types of ratings of perspective/
self-involvement were collected. For autobiographical events, which
were instructed to be viewed from a 1st person perspective,
participants were asked to rate whether they indeed recalled the
event from this perspective, versus the alternative 3rd person
perspective. This rating sought to ensure that not only were
participants actively involved in the recalled autobiographical event,
but that they recalled it from a 1st person perspective. For non-self
events, participants were instructed to recall the event as if it was
playing out in front of them, and not to be present in, or part of, the
scenario. Consequently, we instead asked the participants to rate the
degree of personal involvement or detachment. Although we did not
directly ask them to rate 1st versus 3rd person perspective, we
considered that this alternative rating assessed a more critical aspect
of these events, ensuring that participants were not present and thus
had to be recalling the event from an outsider/observer perspective.
Participants also rated the dynamic or static nature of the event, the
degree of emotional salience, the degree to which the participant
associated a particular period of time with the event (“time stamp”
e.g. past, future, none), and the plausibility of the event. The
participant was also asked to describe out loud all the details recalled
in the scanner for 2–3 example events from each condition, 10–15 real
objects and 10–15 imagined objects. Descriptions were compared
with details provided during the pre-scan interview session to
conﬁrm accurate recall.
fMRI scanning parameters
T2⁎-weighted echo planar (EPI) images with blood oxygen level-
dependent (BOLD) contrast were acquired on a 1.5 tesla Siemens AG
(Erlangen, Germany) Sonata MRI scanner. Scanning parameters wereselected to achieve whole brain coverage: 45 oblique axial slices
angled at 30 degrees in the anterior–posterior axis, 2 mm thickness
(1 mm gap), repetition time of 4.05 s. The ﬁrst 6 ‘dummy’ volumes
from each session were discarded to allow for T1 equilibration effects.
A T1-weighted structural MRI scan was acquired for each participant
after the functional scanning sessions.
Data analysis
Data were analyzed using SPM5 (www.ﬁl.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm).
Spatial preprocessing consisted of realignment and normalization to
a standard EPI template in Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI)
spacewith a resampled voxel size of 3×3×3mm, and smoothing using
a Gaussian kernel with full width at half maximum of 8mm. Statistical
analysis was performed using the general linear model. The experi-
ment had 6 event conditions (RS, RF, RN, IS, IF, IN) which were
compared against 6 object control conditions (RO1, RO2, RO3, IO1, IO2,
IO3). The main time period of interest was the 20 second recall/re-
experience interval while participants had their eyes closed. This
period was modelled as a boxcar function (20 second duration) and
convolved with the canonical haemodynamic response function to
create regressors of interest. Participant-speciﬁc movement para-
meters were included in the design as regressors of no interest.
Participant-speciﬁc parameter estimates relating to each regressor,
collapsed across the 6 sessions, were calculated for each voxel. These
parameter estimates were entered into a second level random-effects
analysis using a one-way ANOVA. The full network of regions activated
across all event types, minus their respective object baseline
conditions, was investigated using the standard conjunction function
implemented in SPM5 (global; pb0.001 uncorrected; minimum
cluster size of 5 voxels). Experimental conditions were then
contrasted to further probe the functional contributions of regions
within this network by entering the parameter estimates into a second
level random-effect analysis using standard t test analyses. An
additional parametric analysis was performed to investigate whether
variations in the behavioural rating scores for difﬁculty, vividness and
perceived accuracy modulated activity in any regions of the brain. All
three behavioural ratings scores were entered as parametric mod-
ulators of interest for each condition type and their respective
parameter estimates were entered into a second level random-effect
analysis using standard t test analyses.
Regions of a priori interest for the autobiographical memory
network, including cortical midline areas, were derived from previous
studies and a meta-analysis (Addis et al., 2004, 2007; Buckner and
Carroll, 2007; Cabeza and St Jacques, 2007; Gilboa et al., 2004;
Hassabis et al., 2007a; Maguire, 2001a; Maguire and Frith, 2003a,b;
Ryan et al., 2001; Schacter et al., 2007; Svoboda et al., 2006) and are
speciﬁed in the ﬁrst paragraph of the Introduction. For all contrasts we
report areas in this entire network that survived using a threshold of
pb0.001 uncorrected for multiple comparisons with a minimum
cluster size of 5 voxels. We employed a corrected threshold of pb0.05
(FWE) for areas that were not hypothesised in advance, and none
survived correction. Note that for complete transparency, in the tables
we include all areas that survived using the threshold pb0.001
uncorrected for multiple comparisons. However, we do not discuss
areas on these tables that were not hypothesised in advance, and
primarily focus our discussion on those areas of the memory network
most germane to our main interest, namely cortical midline regions.
In addition, we also applied small volume correction. We used the
main effect of all memory events minus the baseline object controls to
establish the distributed network. We identiﬁed our regions of
interest from this contrast (based on the extant literature alluded to
previously). We noted the peak coordinate in each area at pb0.001
(uncorrected). We used these coordinates to deﬁne the regions of
interest (RoIs) for the contrasts summarised in Fig. 5 (where these
contrasts relate to comparisons between the different event types).
Fig. 2. Brain areas activated in common for all event types. The brain areas engaged by
all events types were revealed by a conjunction analysis. A widespread network of
regions was activated including hippocampus, lateral temporal cortices, precuneus,
posterior cingulate cortex, retrosplenial cortex, medial frontal regions and cerebellum.
Table 4 details the coordinates of all activation peaks. Top right panel shows a sagittal
image from a ‘glass brain’, which enables one to appreciate activations in all locations
and levels in the brain simultaneously. The other panels show activations on a selection
of relevant sagittal, coronal and axial sections from the averaged structural MRI scan of
the 18 participants. R = right; L = left. The colour bar indicates the Z-score associated
with each voxel.
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then employed Bonferroni correction to take account of the number of
regions in each hemisphere and adjusted the p values accordingly (left
hemisphere, 6 regions, new corrected threshold p=0.008; right
hemisphere, 4 regions, new corrected threshold p=0.01) to conﬁrm
these areas were signiﬁcantly active at this corrected threshold. The
peak coordinates from the main effect contrast used to deﬁne the RoIs
were: right medial PFC (3,30,24), left medial PFC (−6,−30,−12;
−3,54,27), left anterior cingulate cortex (−3,18,−9), left ventromedial
PFC (−9,42,−12), left retrosplenial cortex (−6,−51,3;−12,−60,15), right
posterior cingulate cortex (21,−60,21), right precuneus (3,−51,−39;0,
−60,39). In addition, when considering activations in adjacent brain
areas, only those whose peak voxels were more than the smoothing
kernel (8 mm) apart were regarded as separate. All activations are
displayed on sections of the average structural image of all the
participants and conform to MNI coordinate space.
Results
Behavioural data
Interview session (week 2)
One week after viewing the ﬁlm and news clips participants
recalled on average 97.4% (SD 7.1) of ﬁlm events and 96.0% (SD 5.6) of
the news clips thus demonstrating robust memories for the non-self
events.
MRI scan session (week 3)
During fMRI scanning participants rated three aspects of their
performance during each trial: difﬁculty (1=very easy...5=very hard),
vividness (1=not at all vivid...5=very vivid) and perceived accuracy of
recall (1=not very accurate...5=very accurate). The three ratings were
broadly comparable across the event and object conditions (see Table
3). Difﬁculty was rated low on average (mean 0.83, SD 0.34), while
vividness (mean 3.9; SD 0.36) and perceived accuracy of recall (mean
3.7; SD 0.40) were rated high. Formal comparisons between the
conditions were conducted using a repeated-measures ANOVA testing
the factors of stimulus type (event; object), reality (real; previously
imagined) and category (self; ﬁlm; news). For all three behavioural
measures (vividness, difﬁculty and perceived accuracy) event and
object stimulus types were equivalent {all [F(1,17)b1.8, pN0.2]}. By
contrast, signiﬁcant differences were found across the factors of
reality and category. Real events and real objects were recalled more
easily, more vividly and with a greater degree of perceived accuracy
than imagined events and imagined objects {all [F(1,17)N33.5,
pb0.001]}, and this effect was observed for all three event categories
(self, ﬁlm and news). In addition, differences were observed between
event categories. Self and ﬁlm events were relatively well matched,
only differing in the degree of perceived accuracy [F(1,17)=5.5,
p=0.03], but not in terms of vividness or difﬁculty {both [F(1,17)b
4.1, pN0.06]}. Both self and ﬁlm events were recalled more easily,Table 3
Behavioural ratings from the memory recall task during scanning
Conditions Ratings (1=low … 5=high): mean (SD)
Difﬁculty Vividness Accuracy
Previously experienced autobiographical
events (RS)
0.29 (0.37) 4.47 (0.43) 4.39 (0.45)
Previously viewed ﬁlm events (RF) 0.34 (0.25) 4.34 (0.46) 4.20 (0.49)
Previously viewed news events (RN) 0.82 (0.51) 3.80 (0.66) 3.63 (0.60)
Previously imagined autobiographical
events (IS)
0.89 (0.61) 3.85 (0.69) 3.66 (0.65)
Previously imagined ﬁlm events (IF) 1.20 (0.44) 3.60 (0.60) 3.33 (0.64)
Previously imagined news events (IN) 1.59 (0.63) 3.13 (0.77) 2.86 (0.78)
Previously viewed objects (RO) 0.72 (0.46) 4.12 (0.48) 3.93 (0.56)
Previously imagined objects (IO) 0.91 (0.57) 3.79 (0.56) 3.68 (0.62)more vividly and with a greater degree of perceived accuracy than
news events {all [F(1,17)N20.5, pb0.001]}.
Post-scan debrieﬁng
A number of additional variables were probed in the post-scan
debrieﬁng session. The perspective taken and the degree of self-
involvement were assessed for self and non-self events respectively.
Autobiographical events were rated as being recalled more often from
a 1st person perspective than from a 3rd person perspective (1=3rd
person...5=1st person) for both real (mean 4.2, SD 1.3) and previously
imagined (3.4, SD 1.8) events, as instructed. Interestingly, real self
events were rated as being slightlymore from a 1st person perspective
than imagined self events (t(17)=1.9, p=0.04). For non-self events,
participants were instructed to recall the events as if they were
playing out in front of them, and to be personally detached and absent
from the event. Participants rated this degree of self-involvement and,
in accordance with this instruction, reported that they were
personally detached (1=detached...5= involved) from both real and
previously imagined non-self conditions [RF: 1.5 (SD 1.0); RN: 1.3 (SD
0.7); IF: 1.3 (SD 0.7) IN: 1.2 (SD 0.6)]. There was no signiﬁcant
difference between the ratings of detachment for non-self events
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tion: [F(1,17)=0.4, p=0.8]}. In addition there were no signiﬁcant
differences in the plausibility ratings between imagined events, with
all three categories rated as plausible {implausible=1...plausible=5;
[IS: 3.7 (SD 1.2); IF: 3.8 (SD 1.2); IN: 3.2 (SD 1.2)]; category: [F(2,34)=
3.0, p=0.6]}. Participants also rated the imagined self events as
dynamic and with active involvement of themselves (1=static...5=
dynamic), rather than simply a static scene (4.1, SD 1.2).
Ratings of the emotional salience of event conditions were also
taken. Although all events were selected to be of neutral or slightly
positive emotional salience, real events, especially real self events,
were rated with higher emotional salience (1=low...5=high) than the
other conditions {RS: 3.4 (SD 0.8); RF 2.4 (SD 0.9); RN 1.6 (SD 0.8); IS 2.3
(SD 1.0); IF 2.1 (SD 1.0); IN 1.3 (SD 0.5); reality×category interaction:
[F(2,34)=4.5, p=0.02]}. Post hoc analyses showed that this reality×
category interaction was primarily driven by real self events, rather
than real events in general {SelfNﬁlm: [F(1,17)=7.1, p=0.016]; Self -
news: [F(1,17)=6.8, p=0.018]; FilmNnews: [F(1,17)=0.0, p=1.0]}.
In addition, participants also rated howmuch “in the past” they felt
the recalled event was (1=no time stamp...5= in the past). As expected,
real events, especially real self events, were typically rated as feeling
more in the past [RS: 4.5 (SD 1.0); RF: 3.1 (SD 1.8); RN: 2.4 (SD 1.6)] than
previously imagined events [IS: 1.5 (SD 1.0); IF: 1.6 (SD 1.2); IN: 1.9 (SD
1.5)], which were rated as having no time stamp {reality×category
interaction: [F(2,34)=12.9, p=0.001]}. Post hoc analyses showed that,
like emotional salience, this reality×category interactionwas primarily
driven by real self events {SelfNﬁlm: [F(1,17)=9.8, p=0.006]; Self -
news: [F(1,17)=31.8, pb0.001]; FilmNnews: [F(1,17)=3.4, p=0.083]}.
Neuroimaging data
Overview
This rich data set is amenable to analysis in numerousways. For the
sake of clarity, here we report ﬁndings that speak directly to our mainTable 4
Brain regions activated by all event types (conjunction analysis)⁎
Region Peak coordinate (x, y, z) Z
Left medial superior frontal gyrus −9 63 24 N8
Medial ventral frontal cortex 0 48 −12 N8
Left anterior cingulate cortex (ventral) −3 18 −15 5.05
Left medial pre-supplementary motor area −3 6 69 6.21
Left superior frontal gyrus −21 39 48 3.82
Left middle frontal gyrus–frontal eye ﬁelds −36 6 57 6.91
Left inferior frontal gyrus −54 21 15 5.04
Left inferior frontal gyrus −51 30 0 4.81
Right inferior frontal gyrus 57 30 9 4.81
Left thalamus −15 −15 9 4.14
Right superior temporal gyrus 45 15 −33 6.83
Left superior temporal sulcus −57 −3 −21 N8
−51 −42 −3 N8
Right superior temporal sulcus 48 −36 −3 3.76
Right hippocampus 18 −30 −9 4.98
Left parahippocampal gyrus −24 −36 −15 5.61
Right parahippocampal gyrus 30 −36 −18 4.90
Left precuneus −3 −54 36 N8
Left posterior cingulate −6 −42 39 N8
Right posterior cingulate 12 −54 30 5.87
Left retrosplenial cortex −9 −54 3 6.36
Left parietal-occipital sulcus −12 −60 12 7.76
Right parietal-occipital sulcus 21 −60 21 N8
Left angular gyrus/temporo-parietal junction −48 −69 30 N8
Right angular gyrus/temporo-parietal junction 42 −63 27 6.69
Occipital cortex 0 −69 −3 4.40
6 −87 −18 4.33
Right cerebellum 9 −48 −48 6.71
Left posterior cerebellum −27 −81 −36 4.94
Right posterior cerebellum 27 −84 −33 N8
⁎ The contrasts entered into the conjunction analysis were: (RS–RO1) (RF–RO2) (RN–
RO3) (IS–IO1) (IF–IO2) (IN–IO3).
Fig. 3. Brain areas preferentially engaged by the self. (A) Brain regions more active
during the recall of real autobiographical memories (RS) compared to the recall of
previously imagined autobiographical memories (IS). Table 5 details the coordinates of
all activation peaks. Bottom left panel shows a sagittal image from a ‘glass brain’. The
other panels show activations on a selection of relevant sagittal and axial sections from
the averaged structural MRI scan of all participants. (B) Recalling autobiographical
events (real and imagined: RS+IS) activated a distinct set of brain areas when compared
with recalling non-self ﬁlm and news events (real and imagined: RF+IF+RN+IN). Table
6 details the coordinates of all activation peaks. Right-sided panels show sagittal and
axial images from a ‘glass brain’. The other panels show activations on two relevant
sagittal sections from the averaged structural MRI scan of all participants. Below are the
condition speciﬁc parameter estimates (betas) in arbitrary units at the peak voxels of
two regions. Bars represent the standard error. Red = retrosplenial cortex, blue =
ventromedial prefrontal cortex. R = right; L = left. The colour bars indicate the Z-score
associated with each voxel.focus on cortical midline structures and how selfness and realness
modulated activity in these regions. In all of the comparisons
described below, each of the 6 event conditions (RS, RF, RN, IS, IF,
IN), was ﬁrst analyzed relative to its corresponding object control
condition (RO1, RO2, RO3; IO1 IO2, IO3; 6 different sets). We included
the behavioural ratings (difﬁculty, vividness, perceived accuracy) as
covariates in a parametric analysis asking whether activity in any
brain areas correlated with the scores. This analysis revealed no
Table 6
Recall of autobiographical events (real+ imagined)Nrecall of ﬁlm and news events (real
+ imagined)⁎
Region Peak coordinate (x, y, z) Z
Left lateral superior frontal gyrus −12 54 33 3.97
−27 51 27 3.45
−18 39 33 3.71
Left lateral orbital frontal gyrus −33 36 −12 3.70
Left medial ventral frontal cortex −6 33 −12 3.81
Right anterior cingulate gyrus 6 33 24 3.88
3 18 24 3.55
Left middle frontal gyrus–frontal eye ﬁelds −24 6 60 4.56
Left inferior frontal gyrus −51 9 33 3.45
Left postcentral gyrus −36 −24 39 3.81
Right caudate nucleus 18 6 21 3.91
Left thalamus −9 −15 12 3.41
Right posterior cingulate cortex 6 −30 36 3.86
Left retrosplenial cortex −6 −54 6 5.08
Left precuneus −9 −72 54 3.66
Left angular gyrus/temporo-parietal junction −39 −81 27 3.58
Left calcarine sulcus −6 −96 0 3.56
Right posterior cerebellum 18 −84 −36 3.85
⁎ [(RS+ IS)− (RO1+IO1)]N [(RF+ IF+RN+IN)− (RO2+IO2+RO3+IO3)].
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vividness, difﬁculty or perceived accuracy. This is most likely because
the conditions were generally well matched and the scores were
broadly similar.
Overall network
We ﬁrst sought to identify the distributed set of brain regions
activated in common across the six event conditions. In this
conjunction analysis we replicated the well-established network of
brain areas reliably activated in studies of autobiographical memory,
imagination of scenes, and episodic future thinking (Cabeza and St
Jacques, 2007; Maguire, 2001a; Rugg et al., 2002; Svoboda et al.,
2006), comprising the hippocampus, parahippocampal gyrus, lateral
temporal cortex, RSC, PCC, precuneus, temporo-parietal junction,
thalamus, cerebellum andmPFC (Fig. 2, Table 4). While many previous
studies of autobiographical memory recall have focused on the role of
the hippocampus (e.g. Addis et al., 2004; Gilboa et al., 2004; Maguire
and Frith, 2003b; Ryan et al., 2001), hippocampal activity was not the
primary interest of this study. Instead, activity in the hippocampus
and underlying parahippocampal cortex was not apparent in any of
the subsequent contrasts between event conditions, suggesting its
activation reﬂects a common mechanism during retrieval, or perhaps
a role in providing the spatial context for both real and imagined
events (e.g. Hassabis et al., 2007a,b; Hassabis and Maguire, 2007;
Addis et al., 2007; Schacter et al., 2007).
Having established the basic network involved in supporting
events, we then focused on examining brain areas modulated by
selfness and realness in order to functionally deconstruct the spatially
extended midline frontal and posterior activations apparent in Fig. 2.
Regions modulated by real self and self
As noted above, a ﬁrst step in breaking down the functional
subdivisions within this memory network was taken by Hassabis et al.
(2007a). Here, unlike the study by Hassabis et al. (2007a), we were
able to dissociate the factor of selfness from the factor of realness.
When recall of real autobiographical (self) memories was compared
with recalling self-relevant events that were previously imagined we
found that several regions were more active during recall of real
autobiographical events (real selfN imagined self; Fig. 3A, Table 5).
These included the PCC (especially on the right) extending into the
precuneus, bilateral activations in the angular gyrus/temporo-parietal
junction, and anteriorly in the mPFC speciﬁcally in ventromedial
prefrontal cortex. Additional activations were observed in the frontal
eye ﬁelds, and left and right cerebellum. The opposite contrast yielded
no signiﬁcant activations.
We were then able to go beyond previous studies by identifying
brain regions that were driven speciﬁcally by the “self” aspect of an
event (selfNnon-self; collapsed across real and imagined events).
Several regions were more active when recalling self events compared
to events of the other two non-self categories (ﬁlm and news) (Fig. 3B,Table 5
Recall of real autobiographical eventsNrecall of imagined autobiographical events⁎
Region Peak coordinate (x, y, z) Z
Left medial ventral frontal cortex −9 42 −9 3.45
Right anterior cingulate cortex 3 33 −3 3.49
Left middle frontal gyrus–frontal eye ﬁelds −21 24 45 3.49
Right insula 39 12 0 3.97
Right postcentral gyrus 30 −33 54 3.84
Left posterior cingulate cortex −3 −12 30 4.08
Right parietal occipital sulcus 12 −66 27 5.32
Left angular gyrus/temporo-parietal junction −48 −66 33 3.54
Right angular gyrus/temporo-parietal junction 42 −72 36 4.05
Left cerebellum −21 −36 −42 3.93
−18 −51 −30 3.57
Right cerebellum 27 −51 −33 3.44
⁎ (RS–RO1)N (IS–IO1).Table 6). These included activations posteriorly in the RSC extending
dorsally along the parieto-occipital sulcus (POS; especially on the left),
dorsal precuneus and in the left angular gyrus/temporo-parietal
junction. Frontal activations were observed medially in the anteriorFig. 4. Comparison of brain regions modulated by self and real self. The brain regions
preferentially activated when recalling real autobiographical (RS) events compared to
imagined autobiographical (IS) events (yellow) are overlaid on the same brain (averaged
structural MRI scan of all participants) as regions that were more active for recalling
autobiographical events (real and imagined: RS+IS) compared to non-self (ﬁlm and
news, both real and imagined: RF+IF+RN+IN) events (red). Regions that were active in
both contrasts are shown in orange. R = right, L = lef t.
Fig. 5. Functional subdivisions within cortical midline regions. The self-related overlays from Fig. 4′s medial sagittal sections are shown enlarged in the centre: in red are regionsmore
active for recalling self events compared to non-self events, in yellow are areas engaged more for recalling real self (RS) events compared to imagined self (IS) events, in orange is the
overlap between the two (see legend of Fig. 4 and Results). Midline cortical activations observed when recalling real events compared to imagined events (all categories together) are
overlaid in blue, with the results of the actual SPM contrast shown in smaller sagittal sections on the periphery. Midline cortical activations observed when recalling ﬁlm events
compared to news events (collapsed across real and imagined events) are overlaid in green, with the result of the actual SPM contrast shown in smaller sagittal sections on the
periphery. Overlaid in magenta is the peak region of the precuneus active during all six event conditions, with the actual SPM of the conjunction analysis also shown in a smaller
sagittal section on the periphery. See text and tables for details of coordinates. R = right, L = left. The colour bar in the top right indicates the Z-score associated with each voxel for the
smaller sagittal sections located on the periphery. The colour code along the bottom indicates each contrast displayed on the enlarged brains in the centre.
Table 7
Recall of previously viewed (‘real’) eventsNrecall of previously imagined events⁎
Region Peak coordinate (x, y, z) Z
Left medial pre-supplementary motor area −3 −3 63 3.96
Left anterior cingulate cortex (ventral) −3 18 −6 3.73
Right postcentral gyrus 48 −9 54 3.69
Right superior temporal sulcus 60 3 −18 3.78
Left retrosplenial cortex −9 −45 0 3.23
Right retrosplenial cortex 9 −51 6 5.67
Right precuneus 3 −51 45 4.12
Left posterior cingulate cortex −15 −57 18 4.36
Left calcarine sulcus −9 −96 6 3.38
⁎ [(RS+RF+RN)− (RO1+RO2+RO3)]N [(IS+IF+ IN)− (IO1+ IO2+ IO3)].
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in ventromedial prefrontal cortex. Laterally, there was increased
activity in the left lateral orbital gyrus and frontal eye ﬁelds.
Subcortical activations were apparent in the medial dorsal nuclei of
the left thalamus and in the right head of the caudate nucleus.
In order to visualise the relationship between brain regions
modulated by the “self” aspects of memory, Fig. 4 displays the results
of the above contrasts (real selfN imagined self; selfNnon-self)
simultaneously. A striking distinction in the areas modulated for
each contrast is apparent, with a small degree of overlap in some
areas. The POS, dorsal anterior cingulate cortex and medial dorsal
nucleus of the thalamus were preferentially involved in recalling self
events (real or imagined) compared to non-self events. By contrast,
the PCC, precuneus and right angular gyrus/temporo-parietal junction
were preferentially activated for real autobiographical memories
compared to previously imagined self events. In addition, there were
two small regions where the activations overlapped, in RSC extending
into the POS, and anteriorly in ventromedial prefrontal cortex
(although see below).
Regions modulated by realness
This prominent distinction between regions that differentiated
between self and non-self events, and regions which differentiated
between whether that self event really happened or had only been
imagined, provides novel insights into functional sub-regions within
the vast swathes of midline cortical activity observed in Fig. 2.
However, it is also clear from Fig. 2 that the sub-regions we have
identiﬁed so far only encompass part of the large spatially extendedmidline activations. Using comparisons of our other experimental
conditions we therefore sought to determine the functional roles of
more areas across the cortical midline. We concentrated on areas
within the range of +12 to −12mm in the x direction as themajority of
the relevant activations were focused across this region both in this
and previous studies (e.g. Addis et al., 2007; Cabeza and St Jacques,
2007; D'Argembeau et al., 2008; Gilboa et al., 2004; Hassabis et al.,
2007a; Maguire, 2001a; Maguire and Frith, 2003a; Maguire and
Mummery, 1999; Schacter et al., 2007; Svoboda et al., 2006; Szpunar
et al., 2007). To ensure that all regions survived correction at a more
stringent threshold, small volume correction (SVC) was performed on
the peak voxel within each region of interest across the cortical
midline, with further correction for the number of regions under
consideration.
Table 8
Recall of ﬁlm events (real+ imagined)N recall of news events (real+ imagined)⁎
Region Peak coordinate (x, y, z) Z
Medial superior frontal gyrus 0 54 27 4.55
Left medial ventral frontal cortex 3 45 −21 3.72
Right middle temporal gyrus 48 12 −33 4.57
60 −9 −18 3.93
Right superior temporal sulcus 48 −33 −6 4.80
Left angular gyrus/temporo-parietal junction −57 −60 30 3.89
Right angular gyrus/temporo-parietal junction 57 −57 24 3.82
Precuneus 0 −60 42 3.99
⁎ [(RF+ IF)− (RO2+ IO2)]N [(RN+IN)− (RO3+ IO3)].
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real compared to previously imagined autobiographical/self events. To
explore this further, we extended the comparison to include all
category types together (self, ﬁlm and news). This allowed us to
determine the cortical midline areas that were more active when
recalling real events of all types compared to previously imagined
events (realN imagined; collapsed across all 3 event categories). We
found real events were associated with activity in the left PCC, right
precuneus, and anteriorly in the pre-supplementary motor area (pre-
SMA) and ventral anterior cingulate cortex. Fig. 5 shows these midline
activations (in blue, see also Table 7) relative to the regions activated
by the two self contrasts (selfNnon-self and RSN IS) shown in Fig. 4. All
regions shown in Fig. 5 survived SVC except a small activation in the
ventromedial PFC (yellow) in the real selfN imagined self condition.
Activations are also shown relative to the peak activation from the
central portion of the precuneus (see Fig. 2, Table 4) which was active
for all 6 event conditions (shown in magenta on Fig. 5). As might be
expected, activity associated with recalling real events of all categories
in left PCC partially overlapped with activations observed in the real
selfN imagined self contrast. The right precuneus activationwas dorsal
to regions in right PCC/precuneus activated for real self events. An
additional activation was observed bilaterally in the RSC for real
events. This coincided with areas that showed overlap in Fig. 4.
However, the parameter estimates (betas) revealed that the activation
was overwhelmingly driven the real self condition rather than by a
main effect of realness (RS: 0.9; RF: 0.2; RN: 0.2; IS: 0.3; IF: 0.06; IN:
0.004). Anteriorly, the two (dorsal and ventral) medial frontal
activations for real events were distinct from the anterior region
modulated by self. The opposite contrast, comparing previously
imagined events with real events, revealed no signiﬁcant differences
in activity across midline brain regions.
Further deconstruction of midline cortical regions
The inclusion of three different categories of events (self, ﬁlm and
news) allowed us not only to explore the neural correlates of self but
also to make comparisons between two types of non-self events. Non-
self events were selected from a feature length ﬁlm or from news
events seen on TV. Comparisons between ﬁlm events and news events
(collapsed across real and imagined events) revealed differences in a
number of midline regions that were more active when recalling ﬁlm
than news events. These included the dorsal precuneus, and anteriorly
the medial superior frontal gyrus (green areas on Fig. 5; see also Table
8). Interestingly, the superior frontal region was also more active for
self events (real and imagined conditions together) compared to news
events (3,51,27; Z-score=4.14). The opposite contrast examining brain
regions that were more active for recalling news events compared to
ﬁlm events (or self events) yielded no signiﬁcant differences across
midline brain regions.
Discussion
Two deﬁning features of autobiographical experiences are their
relevance to the self and their occurrence in the real world. Despite theimportance of understanding how one's personal experience of an
event is represented, and the obvious advantage of being able to
distinguish aneventwhich really happened fromonewhichwas simply
created internally, the neural correlates of selfness and realness remain
unclear in the context of autobiographicalmemory. In the current study
we experimentally manipulated these factors using a novel paradigm
that enabled us to identify brain areas speciﬁcally modulated by the
self-relevance of experiences, and to dissociate these from areas
engaged by the realness of events. Therefore in this experiment we
were able to effect a functional deconstruction of anterior and posterior
cortical midline regions that are widely associated with autobiogra-
phical memory during neuroimaging (Cabeza and St Jacques, 2007;
Maguire, 2001a; Svoboda et al., 2006). All recalled events were recent
and well matched for memory age. Nevertheless, our task design
dictatedminordifferences in agebetween real and imagined conditions
(RS versus IS: average 14 days; RF/RN versus IF/IN: 7 days) and between
self and non-self conditions (average 7 days). However, given that all
events were very recent, and activity in the hippocampus, the primary
region shown to be modulated by memory age (e.g. Gilboa et al., 2004;
Maguire and Frith, 2003b; Ryan et al., 2001), did not differ across our
event conditions, it is unlikely that memory age signiﬁcantly affected
our results.
Anterior midline regions
While sub-divisions within medial prefrontal cortex have been
explored and debated in various domains of cognition (e.g. Amodio
and Frith, 2006; Gilbert et al., 2006; Northoff and Bermpohl, 2004;
Ongur et al., 2003; Ramnani and Owen, 2004; Rushworth et al., 2007a,
b), there has been a paucity of such work in the context of
autobiographical memory. Here we identiﬁed distinct dorsomedial
and ventromedial prefrontal areas that were modulated by selfness
and realness. Recalling self events compared to non-self events
activated a region in the right dorsomedial prefrontal cortex extending
from the anterior cingulate cortex into the superior frontal gyrus.
Interestingly, this area was not observed in the full common network
(Fig. 2) suggesting it makes a speciﬁc contribution to autobiographical
events. In support of this, a recent study investigating real autobio-
graphical memory recall compared to an imagined non-self baseline
task observed activation in this region (Szpunar et al., 2007), and it has
been engaged during other self-representation studies (e.g. D'Argem-
beau et al., 2007; Sugiura et al., 2005), suggesting this area is
associated with self-referential processing during memory recall. This
anterior cingulate region was ﬂanked anteriorly by a region in the
superior frontal gyrus which was active in all conditions but showed
greater enhancement for both the self and ﬁlm events (real and
imagined) compared to the news condition. This region is commonly
activated in studies of mentalizing about self or others, (Blakemore
and Decety, 2001; Gallagher and Frith, 2003; Gallagher et al., 2000;
Johnson et al., 2002; Mitchell et al., 2005a,b; Ochsner et al., 2004;
Olsson and Ochsner, 2008). In the current experiment, real and
imagined self and ﬁlm events share similarities in their naturalistic
rich character knowledge, and their recall required participants to
reﬂect on the mental states, thoughts and actions of themselves, and
the ﬁlm characters. In contrast, news events had sparse character
knowledge, limiting the likelihood of self/other mentalizing. Thus
these data support the view that this superior frontal region mediates
mentalizing processes about the self and other individuals.
Therewas one additional dorsal region locatedwithin the pre-SMA
where activity was enhancedwhen participants recalled real events of
all categories compared to imagined events. Activitywithin this region
has commonly been observed in studies of cognitive control processes
such as in conﬂict, uncertainty and error monitoring (Amodio and
Frith, 2006; Holroyd et al., 2004; Ridderinkhof et al., 2004; Rushworth
et al., 2007b), as well as in studies of autobiographical memory (Gilboa
et al., 2004; Hassabis et al., 2007a) and self-relevance judgements
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Moran et al., 2006). It has been suggested this region may mediate
performance monitoring processes such as the interplay between
internal and external demands (Gusnard et al., 2001; Holroyd et al.,
2004; Ridderinkhof et al., 2004). One possible reason for activation of
this region in the current study could be that monitoring recall
performance relative to experienced real events may have up-
regulated this region compared with events that were only ever
experienced internally.
Selfness and realness also activated adjacent areas in left
ventromedial prefrontal cortex. The most posterior activation was in
ventral anterior cingulate (subgenual) cortex and was engaged when
recalling real events of all categories compared to imagined events. A
number of recent studies have suggested this region may mediate the
interaction between the emotional signiﬁcance and the self-relevance
of stimuli (Moran et al., 2006; Sharot et al., 2007; van den Bos et al.,
2007). It has also been activated in studies of reality monitoring using
simpliﬁed stimuli (Simons et al., 2008; Turner et al., 2008). A more
anterior region located within the orbitomedial prefrontal cortex was
activated by self more than non-self events. This was ﬂanked
anteriorly by a region more active when processing real self events
compared to imagined self events, although this latter region did not
survive small volume correction. Previous studies of self-representa-
tion, confabulation, and autobiographical memory recall have impli-
cated the ventral portion of the mPFC, especially when the stimuli
have explicit emotional associations (Gusnard et al., 2001; Kjaer et al.,
2002; Northoff et al., 2007; Piefke et al., 2003; Schnider, 2003; van den
Bos et al., 2007). In general the ventral/orbitomedial prefrontal cortex
has been engaged by tasks involving emotion and reward behaviours
(e.g. Bechara et al., 2000; Breiter et al., 2001; Knutson et al., 2001;
O'Doherty et al., 2003; Rolls, 2000; van den Bos et al., 2007). Although
stimuli in the current study were selected so their emotional valence
was neutral, subjective emotional ratings showed that real events and
in particular real self events were more emotionally salient. This
suggests that real events have a greater emotional impact during recall
perhaps due to the manner in which they were initially experienced
and perceived in an external multi-sensory context. By contrast,
internally generated events only occurred within the imagination and
their salience may be less, despite similar amounts of subjective
emotional descriptors in the event content.
Posterior midline regions
Posteriorly the PCC, precuneus, and RSC, have been consistently
engaged during studies of autobiographical memory recall, self-
representation, and future thinking (Addis et al., 2007; D'Argembeau
et al., 2007; Daselaar et al., 2008; Gilboa et al., 2004; Hassabis et al.,
2007a; Johnson et al., 2002; Maguire, 2001a; Northoff et al., 2006;
Schacter et al., 2007; Sugiura et al., 2005; Svoboda et al., 2006; Szpunar
et al., 2007; Vogeley and Fink, 2003). Despite the swathes of activity
that encompass this large spatially-extended region during these tasks,
anatomical and connectivity patterns point to distinct underlying sub-
regions (Cavanna and Trimble, 2006; Vogt and Laureys, 2005). In this
study, the central portion of the precuneus was prominently active
across all six event conditions (see Fig. 2). This may reﬂect a common
imagery mechanism involved in the recall of all types of complex
events. In support of this, several studies have implicated the
precuneus in imagery and visualisation of visual-spatial information
in perception andmemory (Cavanna and Trimble, 2006; Fletcher et al.,
1995). Interestingly, we identiﬁed functional sub-divisions within the
precuneus. A more dorsal region (on the right) was preferentially
engaged for real events compared to imagined events across all
categories. Posterior to this, an area of precuneus was more active for
ﬁlm events compared to news events. Increased requirements for
imageryandvisualisation inherent in real events, and inﬁlmmore than
news events, may have recruited additional precuneus resources.Moving ventrally into PCC, we observed activity in right PCC
extending dorsally into the precuneus and ventrally into the POS in
response to real autobiographical events. Within PCC itself, however,
we noted possible lateralised sub-divisions. As well as right PCC being
modulated by real self events, parts of the left PCC were more active
for real events compared to imagined events across all categories,
reﬂecting a more general modulation by the experiencing of real
external events, and not speciﬁc to self-processing. The PCC/
precuneus has been implicated in many studies involving memory
retrieval and familiarity (e.g. Hornberger et al., 2006; Rugg et al.,
2002; Vincent et al., 2006; Wagner et al., 2005) and self representa-
tion (Addis et al., 2007; Hassabis et al., 2007a; Johnson et al., 2002;
Lou et al., 2004; Moran et al., 2006; Ochsner et al., 2004; Sugiura et al.,
2005; Vogeley et al., 2004; Vogt et al., 2006). In a previous study,
Hassabis et al. (2007a) showed that recalling familiar events
compared to newly imagining events activated portions of PCC/
precuneus. In addition, Sugiura et al. (2005) found that parts of PCC
were involved in representing the familiarity of a stimulus, while a
distinct PCC sub-region coded speciﬁcally for personally familiar
places. Similarly, our ﬁndings support the idea that portions of PCC/
precuneus distinguish between the more familiar real events,
compared to imagined events. Furthermore, other areas of PCC
(especially on the right), which overlap with the PCC region speciﬁc
for personally familiar events described by Sugiura et al., are
particularly involved in representing real personal events. Thus our
results add further weight to the view that during autobiographical
memory retrieval the cooperation between self-processing and
familiarity functions performed by these distinct subregions of the
PCC/precuneus, along with the mPFC, may enable the brain to
distinguish between real and imagined experiences (Hassabis et al.,
2007a; Hassabis and Maguire, 2007).
By contrast, activity along the ventral portion of the left POS,
extending into the left and right RSC, coded for the self perspective in
both real and imagined self events. Interestingly, this POS/RSC
activation was more lateralised to the left hemisphere. The function
of the RSC, tucked behind the posterior bend of the corpus callosum,
has proved difﬁcult to establish, with previous studies suggesting it is
involved in both autobiographical memory retrieval and topographi-
cal and visual–spatial processing (Bar and Aminoff, 2003; Byrne et al.,
2007; Epstein and Higgins, 2007; Maguire, 2001a,b; Svoboda et al.,
2006; Wolbers and Buchel, 2005). Indeed, the same POS/RSC region
was observed in another study of autobiographical memory recall
when a non-self condition was used as a control task (Szpunar et al.,
2007), as well as in other studies of autobiographical memory recall as
part of larger swathes of activation (Addis et al., 2007; Hassabis et al.,
2007a; Maguire and Frith, 2003b; Maguire and Mummery, 1999).
Recent studies have postulated that the ventral POS and RSC may
mediate the transformation between self-centred and world-centred
spatial reference frames or viewpoints during memory recall, imagery
and navigation (Burgess, 2006; Byrne et al., 2007; Ino et al., 2002). Its
anatomical position and connectivity with posterior parietal and
medial temporal lobe regions make it ideal for such a role (Kobayashi
and Amaral, 2003, 2007). In the current study, recalling self events
required the participants to constantly update and transform their
personal perspective relative to the spatial context of the environ-
ment, as they progressed through the unfolding event. By contrast, the
detached viewpoint from which participants recalled the non-self
events, which were similarly dynamic in nature but with no self-
involvement, required less self-referencing relative to the environ-
mental context as the event unfolded. The left POS/RSC, possibly in
association with other regions such as the frontal eye ﬁelds, which
were also more active during retrieval of self events (see Tables 5 and
6; see also Wallentin et al., 2008), and hippocampus, may interact
with the mPFC and PCC to provide a functional framework mediating
self-referencing and self-relevance during reconstruction of autobio-
graphical events.
1199J.J. Summerﬁeld et al. / NeuroImage 44 (2009) 1188–1200Overall, we have shown that regions within posteriomedial cortex
and mPFC play distinct roles in processing key aspects of autobio-
graphical memories. We have moved from the gross activations
typically reported in autobiographical memory studies visible in Fig. 2,
to a more reﬁned parcellation shown in Fig. 5. Identiﬁcation of these
sub-divisions is an important step in functionally deconstructing the
cortical midline, with implications for understanding not just the
mechanisms underpinning autobiographical memory, but also other
crucial cognitive operations such as thinking about the future and
navigation (Buckner and Carroll, 2007; Hassabis and Maguire, 2007).
In the future it will be important to establish how these areas interact
with each other and with other parts of the memory network such as
the medial temporal lobe to support the recollective experience.
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